This article discusses how violence between South Africans and Somali migrants plays out in different forms of spatial contestation, victimization and resistance during xenophobic attacks. It analyses Somalis" entrepreneurial strategies and the implications for access and appropriation of social and economic spaces around Cape Town. The article attempts to connect Somali perceptions of xenophobia and about South Africans" claims of spatial entitlement to issues of spatial control, belonging and social inclusion in South Africa. It argues that by establishing businesses in urban spaces and townships, Somali migrants have managed to establish stronger bonds and a collective identity, which give them better control over these spaces. Although their business tactics have propelled spatial contestations in which they have become easy targets during xenophobic incursions, the clustering of businesses has also created Somali-dominated localities around Cape Town, which facilitates rapid mobilisation to respond to or to resist different forms of crime and violence.
INTRODUCTION
The xenophobic violence in post-apartheid South Africa has been characterised by spatial contestations between citizens and non-citizens, whose presence in South Africa"s fledgling democracy has been written as the usurpation of "an exclusive vision of citizenship and related entitlements" (Landau, 2011: 23) . Pro-xenophobia narratives have been framed around myths and imaginations of "a subtle invasion of South African territory" by illegal aliens (Vigneswaran, 2007: 144) . In this context, patterns of social mobilisation and violence characterised by maiming, looting, burning and murders portray unethical display of disillusionment, power, victimisation and resistance from both locals and African migrants. On the one hand Amit & Kriger (2014) and Landau (2011) have argued that xenophobia is symptomatic of local South Africans" erratic reactions to unfulfilled political promises, perhaps because in some instances the violence happens after service delivery protests. On the other hand, this form of violence is also an expression of locals" impassioned belief that access to the already limited resources of South Africa is the exclusive right of autochthons. The attacks on African migrants are therefore triggered by frustrations with the government, resource competition, a post-apartheid sense of entitlement, joblessness, poverty and destitution. These attacks provide opportunities for destitute locals to loot Somali shops and steal basic household products and groceries.
In xenophobia hotspots, we now see apartheid style "spatialised understandings of rights and belonging" used as salient tactics to eliminate "unwanted" Africans and take control of these localities (Landau & Misago, 2009:106; . This perpetuates an essentialist discourse of belonging amongst many South Africans, which establishes "a natural relationship between people and places" (Brun, 2001:17) . Therefore, xenophobia and its violent undercurrents symbolise a new form of political agency in post-apartheid South Africa, which seeks to defend belonging and citizenship as "autochthonous cultural heritage" (Geschiere, 2009: 19) .
The data used in this article was gleaned during a broader project on the experiences of Cape Town-based Somali victims of xenophobia. The article discusses Somalis" perceptions about xenophobia and about South African nationals, constructed from experiences of spatial contestation, different forms of violence, victimisation and resistance during xenophobic attacks. It analyses Somalis" aggressive entrepreneurialism and the implications for access and appropriation of social and economic spaces around Cape Town. Here, the article attempts to connect Somali perspectives about xenophobic violence and South Africans" perceived claims of spatial entitlement to broader issues of spatial control, belonging and social inclusion in the new South Africa. It argues that despite the longstanding intra-business competition between the different social divisions that constitute the Somali migrant community, the establishment of spaza shops i and other forms of businesses in urban spaces and townships in Cape Town, has fostered stronger bonds, business networks and collective identity, which give them better control over these spaces (see Piper & Yu, 2016; Thompson & Grant, 2015) .
For instance, Somali business strategies often propelled spatial contestations in which they have become easy targets during xenophobic incursions and other forms of crime. However, the clustering of Somali businesses has also created Somali dominated spaces, which facilitates rapid mobilisation in response to or to resist any forms of violence against their community, while monopolising business opportunities (Gastrow & Amit, 2013; Piper & Yu, 2016) .
In the following sections, the article uses excerpts from Somali narratives and evidence from existing studies, to analyse Somalis" perceptions about xenophobia and about local South Africans. It attempts to connect these perceptions to conceptions of power, spatial control, victimisation and resistance. Here, I
conceptualise the article and I describe the participants of the project. I explain the research journey and data collection process. Finally, I analyse episodes of narrative accounts from Somali victims of xenophobia.
CONCEPTUALISING THE RIGHTS TO BELONG AND SOCIAL INCLUSION IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA
Globalization has been characterised by the exponential increase in transnational migration and the "privatization of space and power in a period of rapid commercialization and commodification" (Zhang, 2001: 179) . However, this narrative of "free flows and dissolving boundaries is countered by the intensifying reality of borders, divisions and violent strategies of exclusion" (Nyamnjoh 2006:1) . In fact, the ideology of globalisation is now defined through a set of contradictory idioms which express the fortification of national borders, protection of state resources, and citizens against those considered "outsiders". Today, renewed debates about transnational migration and the right to belong especially in South Africa, now focus on tensions between social inclusion and exclusion and the limits of liberal democracy in protecting migrant and refugee rights (Amit & Kriger, 2014; Nyamnjoh, 2006) . For example "the shifting practices of [South Africa"s] Department of Home Affairs (DHA)" reflect global patterns of bureaucratic tactics to de-legitimise and reject migrants and refugees (Amit & Kriger 2014:269) . In Europe and America, for example, the violent reactions to the influx of migrants have been perpetuated by "more exclusionary ideas of citizenship [which are] matched by the urge to detect difference and distinguish between "locals", "national", "citizen", "autochthons" or "insiders" on the one hand, "foreigners", "immigrants", "strangers" or "outsiders"…" on the other hand (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 3) . Nevertheless, increasing transnational migration has led to new forms of citizenship and belonging that can no longer be ignored by states and their citizens. However, with the upsurge of African immigration into South Africa and the perceived competition over dwindling resources, the state and politicians seem to be echoing a return to citizenship based on indigeneity and autochthony. Recent political rhetoric and street level narratives are now very vociferous about locals" exclusive entitlements to spaces, property and state resources, and these rights have been performed with impunity during the series of xenophobic attacks on African migrants (Landau 2011) .
The indigenisation of citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa, which has given rise to several xenophobic attacks of African migrants, is indeed a postcolonial predicament. In the 1960s and 1980s, African migrants experienced several similar incidents of xenophobia in countries like Nigeria, Cote D"Ivoire; Cameroon; Ghana, Zambia, Sierra Leone and so on (Adepoju 1984: 430) . This political framing of citizenship was propelled by the influx of migrants into these countries and the host governments" commitment to protect and preserve limited state resources for indigenes only. An interesting paradox is that while local South Africans claim ownership of spaces and resources on the basis of indigeneity, as victims of a mutilated Somalia, Somali migrants also "assert their rights to protection as stateless persons under South African government"s international commitments" (Thompson 2016: 90) . Regardless of allegations that they are terrorists "bringing foreign disorder in South Africa" under the guise of refugees and that many of them are living illegally in South Africa, their "assertions of statelessness enable moral claims on South Africa as a relatively strong state, and seek to effect access to opportunities and resources within the country" :87/100).
The intricate spatial contestations and the display of rights to belong suggest that "whether emanating from official institutions or grassroots movements, xenophobic violence takes different forms in different spaces" (Thompson 2016:89) . For example, in townships, it has been displayed through mob actions such as looting, maiming, stoning and burning of victims and property or through banditry and other forms of gangsterism. In urban areas, xenophobia is performed through unscrupulous and tactical police and military operations in migrant-concentrated areas (Gastrow & Amit, 2013; McMichael, 2015) . Xenophobia in South Africa can therefore be linked to the notion that "where there is power, there is resistance" (Foucault, 1978: 95) and conversely "where there is resistance, there is power" (Abu- Lughod, 1990: 42) . We need to read the violence against Somalis in business spaces as a display of spatial control, power and resistance from both Somalis and South Africans. When migrants enter the country of destination, they immediately establish new and often imaginary homes, which they use to, "build up their power and authority by controlling housing and market spaces" (Zhang, 2001: 180) .
Through communal habitations and a sense of collective identity, they gradually implant themselves in residential and commercial spaces, and build "strong and resilient individuals and communities" (Weine, 2013: 81) . With time, these spaces transform into migrant enclaves, contesting the "beliefs that [the rights to belong] are inextricably tied to someone"s territorial origin" (Landau & Misago, 2009: 100) . Any xenophobic attack on African migrants in South Africa therefore reflects an "exclusive claim to territory and resources held within" (Ibid: 101). Scenes of these attacks explain how the South African territory has become a space for political and socioeconomic contestations between the state, its citizens and African migrants. to differentiate between glaring incidents of xenophobia and opportunistic acts of robberies (Amit & Kriger 2014; Gastrow, 2013; Grastrow & Amit 2013; Grant & Thompson, 2015) . Although, I have argued previously that there is a link between xenophobia and perceived acts of banditry, it is necessary to provide a clearer description of participants of this study because South African politicians have tried to downplay xenophobic violence as random acts of criminality and/or robbery, or as the state and citizens" response to illegal aliens and migrant-orchestrated crimes (Hassim, Kupe & Worby, 2008) .
DESCRIPTION OF PARTICIPANTS
The data used in this article was collected from 30 participants residing in the Through the research assistant"s networks and association with the Somali community, I was able to gain access and conduct the interviews. We used a snowball approach to interview all 30 participants. The participants were generally willing to be interviewed because they construed this study as an opportunity to contribute to debates about xenophobia. Before each interview, we explained the purpose of the research and through a consent form, we requested permission to audio-record all the interviews. This form clearly explained ethical issues including confidentiality and anonymity. For this reason, the participants are cited in this article simply as "participant" and suffix numbers between 1 and 30.
Personal interviews were conducted from July to September 2015 and later on transcribed and in some cases translated from Somali/Arabic into English. The data was then categorised into key themes, coded and analysed accordingly. The analysis revealed intricacies of belonging and the characteristics of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. (2013), Piper & Yu (2016) , Thompson & Grant (2015) , and Gastrow (2013) Participant 12"s testimony exudes an arrogance of financial power resulting from Somali economic successes and this power often plays out during contestations over business spaces. As mentioned previously, Somalis" financial power has given them access and control over business spaces in Bellville. Here, this financial power is sometimes used to influence the process of leasing properties from the municipality and from landlords, and/or to force potential competitors out of the race for spaces.
As an owner of a spaza shop in Khayelitsha and a clothing boutique in Bellville, this participant attributes his successes to the financial might of Somali networks in Cape Town and Johannesburg. Although Somalis are legal asylum seekers and refugees, and despite their financial power, there is still a display of autochthonous claims over spaces and an underlying rhetoric, which constructs Somalis as undesirable people reaping where they did not sow. During xenophobic violence, the spatial contestation is also driven by the recurrent "convenient metaphor of illegal alien…gaining undeserved advantages". (Murray, 2003: 447) . The narrative points to South
Africans" attempts to de-legitimise Somalis" right to belong accorded to them by the South African government (Landau, 2011; Nyamnjoh, 2006) .
Moreover, aforementioned studies on xenophobia and Somali businesses allude to locals" discontentment with Somalis" spatial appropriation, which seemingly have deprived South Africans of business opportunities. However, Somali accounts of experiences of xenophobia perceive South Africans" claim over business spaces as a fortuitous sense of entitlement because as bona-fide asylum seekers and refugees, they have the right to operate businesses in South Africa. One participant testifies:
Since the day that Mandela came out of prison, many Africans have been coming to this country because he welcomed us here. South Africans should know that this country does not belong to them only because there are refugees also living here. Their government signed agreements to take care of refugees. They should be happy that we are doing our business not waiting for the government to take care of us (Participant 10).
In this quotation, Somalis audacious right to space originates from a clause in South Africa"s Freedom Charter and constitution that "South Africa belongs to all those who live in it" and from international refugee protection agreements, which South Africa is a signatory (Mcknight 2008; Crush & Pendleton, 2004) . When they came, they started hitting the door with metals and stone and fortunately my shop is in a metal container. They broke the window with stones and they were shouting "come out and we will burn you and this shop".
Luckily for me the police was coming and when they saw the police car they ran away. I was so afraid because I thought they were going to burn me like they did to another Somali shop owner. It is bad but we have nowhere to go because there is still war in Somalia (Participant 11).
In the interview, this participant mentioned that he escaped from Al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia in 2004 and he has lived in South Africa for more than 10 years. During this period he has managed to build a new life with his family and although he has been a victim of violent attacks, he can"t return to Somalia because of Al-Shabaab incursions. For him, xenophobia is essentially "discrimination against non-citizens [which] threatens further fragmentation and social marginalisation" (Landau, 2007: 61) . Despite the legitimate right to belong, they are isolated and remain vulnerable to hostilities because as foreigners they "stand at a site where identity, racism and violence practices are reproduced" (Harris, 2002: no page) .
Contrary to the statement that "South Africa belongs to all those who live in it" the attack of Somalis or any other African migrant is perceived here as an impassioned statement that South Africa is for autochthonous South Africans only. However, Somali migrants often find ways to resist victimisation from locals During xenophobia, these people come out on the streets with everything, stones, knives, hatchets, petrol and even guns, ready to burn African shops and kill. So you can see they do not want us here… Because they do not want us, we have to make sure we fight for ourselves. We have to work together like Somalis and that is why we open our shops in the same place. You see here in Bellville our businesses are together, sometimes in the same building and when South Africans try to attack one person, we can easily join and fight back. One day, they attacked one Somali shop up the street and we saw them, we immediately took our weapons and rushed to the scene. We started fighting with them and as more Somalis were coming they managed to escape (Participant 8)
The idea of clustering shops is a common business strategy and defence mechanism for Somalis in suburbs and in some townships. For example, in Bellville a strong Somali bond is seen when they collude to take over business spaces, sometimes through bribery of local officials, and when they gang up to attack robbers and looters during xenophobic violence. By clustering and controlling business spaces, it is easy to spot danger and mobilise other Somalis. Although, this is not the case in the entire Cape Town, for this participant, business proximity and close networks have been very effective defence mechanisms for many Cape Town-based Somalis.
. Somali experiences of victimisation symbolise generalised tribulations of the African diasporic community in South Africa. These experiences have been written in a grand narrative, which continues to mimic post-apartheid South Africa as a racialised society "where everything is judged in terms of having, taking, owning and controlling" (Gibson, 2011:196) . In the account below, the respondent locates xenophobia within this broader frame of "black on black" racism:
My understanding of xenophobia is that it is racism. When I was in Worcester in 2010; I remember that before the world cup started, our customers told us in one of the local languages that we would go back to our country because we are bringing all the bad things to their country like crime, drugs and corruption. They also are not criminals, so only foreigners bring crime. When they broke into our shops and houses, they stole our stuff: food, clothes, TVs.
Is that not crime? When the police do nothing about it, we have to fight back because we Somalis don"t commit crime; we work hard for our money
This participant has operated a spaza shop for the past seven years in Khayelitsha and his business hours are 6am-10pm every day. This business strategy increases their daily profit margin and creates opportunities for local shop owners and community youths to attack and loot Somali shops especially at night. To incite violence, local shop owners return to common street level narratives which frame Somalis as illegal immigrants and pollutants, bringing crime into their communities.
Interestingly, likening xenophobia to racism even though xenophobia is essentially "black on black violence" (Gibson, 2011: 195) , is not uncommon in today"s South Africa, especially given the ubiquity of racialised behaviours and attitudes from blacks, whites and sometimes from migrants.
In the above quotation, we see the interplay of competing forces, whereby the participant"s construction of South Africans" fervour to get rid of Somalis is met with the victims" strong determination to stay in South Africa. The blaming of Africans as catalysts of the social problems in South Africa is driven by powerful and racist practices which continue to shape post-apartheid South Africa. Here, xenophobia is constructed as a new metaphor for racism as migrants are caught between increasing racial violence emanating from black discontentment and frustrations about widening white racial superiority and privilege after the demise of apartheid (Gibson, 2011; Harris, 2003) . For this respondent, post-apartheid South Africa is still a deeply racially divided society, which continues to oppress and impoverish black South Africans while inversely perpetuating a culture of afro-pessimism, which plays out in different forms of social violence against African migrants.
The victimisation and exclusion of Somalis symbolise the locals" attempts to exorcise the "Other" because apartheid"s policy of isolation ensured that South Africa was left with "no history of incorporating strangers" (Morris, 1998 (Morris, : 1125 . After decades of constitutional democracy and the influx of African migrants, the recurrence of xenophobic violence is an affirmation of the rhetoric of the unwanted stranger or the illegal alien whose activities are constantly linked to criminality, banditry or thuggery.
The attempts to exclude and eliminate Somali migrants reflect a broader local project to exorcise the perceived demons from other parts of Africa (See Landau 2011; Hassim, Kupe & Worby, 2008) .
I don"t think they target us or that we are different to other Africans because they also attack Mozambicans, Nigerians, Zimbabweans, etc. Yes we have shops in the townships but for me it is because South Africans don"t like all foreigners in their country. They think we are bad people who do crime and drugs. But every day they come and rob our shops, who are the criminals here? They just want us out of their country. This is bad because we cannot live here in peace and we can"t go back to our country… (Participant 6) You saw how they burnt the Mozambican guy in 2008, they threw petrol on him and light a match [sic] , and he was burning and shouting and no one came to help him. This is what they are doing to Somalis in the townships, they will hit you with anything, they will shoot you with a gun or burn you if they break into your shop and you are helpless. They are doing this to all foreigners because they are saying we are taking their jobs (Participant 13)
This study revealed that in South African townships, competition over business spaces, pricing and customers have resulted in the burning and looting of many Somali businesses. Although participant 13 has been victimised and robbed several times during the 6 years that he has operated a spaza shop, he feels these incidents are attempts to exorcise not only Somalis but foreigners in general. His recollection of victimisation is narrated against the background of a collective identity used to represent African migrants. Here, the metaphor of the stranger or "immigrant as pollutant" (Cisneros, 2008: 569 ) is used as a tactic for victimisation and rejection.
Also the myth of criminality employed to legitimise xenophobic violence is an unfounded "suspicion that foreigners are derailing the country"s progress towards national self-realisation and the promises of freedom-prosperity, equality, security and global prominence" (Landau & Freemantle, 2010: 378) . there are no plans of returning home because of political instability and al-Shabaab incursions. They stressed that they would rather stay in South Africa and find ways to resist victimisation rather than return to an al-Shabaab-controlled Somalia.
. We are not going anywhere. We come from Somali and we know how to fight war, so they should not think that we are just going to sit and allow them to kill us and take our businesses. We have learnt that the police are also very xenophobic, so they will not always to come to save our lives; we have to do it ourselves, that"s why we have a Somali Association in Cape Town. This association is to bring us together, so that we can support each other. I am sure you saw the way we got into our bakkies and went after the people who came to attack Somalis in one of the townships (Participant 18).
During gruesome attacks of Somali migrants, the South African Police has often failed to respond swiftly because of their own perceptions about foreigners. In some cases, the police have played the role of curious observers, watching with keen interest, how locals violently attack and murder foreign nationals (Hassim, Kupe & Worby 2008 potentially bring with them monumental and threatening changes" (Cisneros, 2008: 569) . Generalised metaphors of criminality or social deviance captured in the excerpts reinforce the dominant narrative in South Africa about the perceived dangers of immigration.
I went to Home Affairs where I filled in forms and was given a permit for 6 months. When it expires, I would normally go back and renew it. The last time I went back, I filled in all the forms. The officer then told me I do not qualify for a 2 year permit. When I asked him the reason for that, he started to insult me.
I told him I don"t deserve these insults but he just carried on, telling me I am a fucking foreigner and I don"t have any right in this country (participant 20)
This participant"s experience at Home Affairs is similar to several other experiences whereby legal migrants and asylum seekers have suddenly become illegal because state officials unlawfully refuse to renew their permits. By so doing, asylum seekers suddenly change from legal to illegal migrants, exposing them to more victimisation from the police and citizens. By framing his experiences around this broader construction of foreigners, their account helps us to understand why the South African government has tended to focus on "nativist, racist and xenophobic justifications for immigration restrictions" (Cisneros, 2008: 571) .
CONCLUSION
During xenophobic violence, there is always a seamless display of power and resistance from state institutions, community groups and migrant communities who are seen "as a threat to the citizenry"s economic and physical well-being" (Landau & Misago, 2009: 102) . In this study, empirical evidence gleaned from participants has exposed us to myriad entrepreneurial strategies used by Somali migrants to access and take control of business spaces in Bellville and Khayelitsha. Although these strategies have positioned them at the margins of xenophobic violence, they have also helped them to build a resilient Somali community capable of resisting different forms of victimisation. In this context, they see themselves as people with "a present life, where they need to survive, to make a livelihood and thus through their actions construct the place where they are physically present" (Brun, 2001: 19) . For them, home is not Somalia but South Africa and they need to confront victimisation, resist and protect themselves from xenophobic violence in urban spaces and townships. In Africa is yet to embrace African migrants with legal documents not as criminals and illegal aliens but as human beings with legitimate rights to live in South Africa. In making meanings from the experiences of Somali victims of xenophobia, this article claims that "spatialised understanding of rights and belonging" is bound to trigger "considerable infighting and competition for power and legitimacy among different groups present in affected areas" (Landau & Misago, 2009:106) . Xenophobic violence illustrates that as local South Africans continue to display an autochthonous sense of belonging through mob violence, they should expect similar reactions from legitimate migrants who have made South Africa their new home. These reactions and counter-reactions to the different conceptions of belonging will see more and more conflicting displays of power, spatial contestation and resistance.
